What an app can reach, and what it cannot. Precisely.
The statements
- An app runs as a WebAssembly component and imports exactly the interfaces its world declares; an undeclared import fails to instantiate.
- An app has no ambient authority: no filesystem, network, clock or environment except through declared access.
- Credentials for outbound calls are held by the platform and injected into the call; an app never holds a key. Boundary: an upstream service can still reflect what it received; scrubbing is defence in depth, not a guarantee.
- Outbound access is to declared hosts only, at a declared rate.
- Secrets are envelope-encrypted at rest, per workspace.
- Every release is signed, and the platform verifies it before running it.
- Inbound webhooks are authenticated and replay-protected.
- Every run is time- and memory-bounded.
- Each workspace runs as its own deployment with its own database, and every app in it has its own database role. Boundary: the platform's operators hold one administrative credential that can reach every workspace's database; per-workspace credentials are planned, not built.
Execution records show what ran, with what input, and what came of it. They do not prove a model's reasoning, and they are not a compliance certification. We hold no SOC 2 or HIPAA attestation today.